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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ANDY GOMEZ, 
Plaintiff? Appellant, 
vs. 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Defendant/Appellee. 
Appellate Court No.: 20010742 
Priority No.: 3 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Rule 3 of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure because the entry of judgment on September 4, 2001 is considered 
to be the final decision of the trial court. See also, Utah Code §78-2a-3(2)(e). 
The Notice of Appeal was filed on September 13, 2001, within thirty (30) days of the 
entry of judgment. Thus, pursuant to Rule 4(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, 
this appeal is timely. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The issue presented for review is whether the trial court erred in dismissing the 
petition for post-conviction relief. [R. 1]. 
The issue presented is a mixed question of law and fact. Findings of fact are 
reviewed for clear error and conclusions of law are reviewed for correctness. Seel v. Van 
DerVeur. 971 P.2d 924, 926 (Utah 1998); Rudolph v. Galteka. 2002 UT 7 (January 18, 
2002). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, CODES AND RULES 
A. Constitutional provisions 
Sixth Amendment, United States Constitution 
Article 1, Section 12, Utah State Constitution 
B. Statutory provisions 
Utah Code §77-32-301 
Utah Code § 77-32-304 
Utah Code §78-35a-104 
Utah Code §78-35a-106 
C. Codes and Rules 
Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 2 
Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3 
Utah Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.7 
Utah Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.8 
Utah Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 3.8 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
Mr. Gomez appeals from the trial court order dismissing his petition for post-
conviction relief. 
B, Course of Proceedings Below 
1. On March 12, 2001, Mr. Gomez filed a petition for post-conviction relief [R. 1.] 
2. On March 26, 2001, the district court entered an order partially dismissing the 
petition as frivolous. [R. 98]. 
3. On May 1, 2002, the State of Utah filed a Motion to Dismiss. [R. 104] 
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4. On May 29, 2001, Mr. Gomez filed a Reply. [R. 107]. 
C Disposition in the Court Below 
On September 4, 2001, the trial court entered an order dismissing Mr. Gomez' 
petition for post-conviction relief. [R. 177]. 
D. Relevant Facts 
On October 21, 1991, Mr. Gomez (hereinafter "Gomez") was charged with 
Aggravated Murder, a Capital Offense and Theft by Receiving Stolen Property, a Third 
Degree Felony.1 [R. 32; Exhibit "E" f2]. At the time of his arrest, San Juan County did 
not have a public defender office nor had the County hired a contract attorney to handle 
indigent cases. [R. 32; Exhibit "E" |42]. The County had entered into an informal 
arrangement with a Price attorney, Keith Chiara (hereinafter "Chiara") to represent 
indigent defendants. [R. 32: Exhibit "E," f 4]. Chiara, however, had been appointed to 
represent Gomez' co-defendant, Scott Heird. [R. 32: Exhibit "E," f 3]. In cases where 
there were two or more defendants, the practice was to assign the case to a local attorney. 
[R 32: Exhibit "E" f4]. Consistent with that practice, a local attorney, Eric Swenson 
(hereinafter "Swenson) was appointed by the trial court on October 24, 1991. [R 32: 
Exhibit "A" and Exhibit "E" ^2]. 
After being appointed to the case, Swenson met with Gomez and began an aggressive 
defense, including filing pretrial motions. [R 32: Exhibit "E," 16]. Swenson then 
JGomez? companion, Jeffrey Scott Heird, was charged as a co-defendant with the 
same crimes. [R. 32; Exhibit E, %3]. 
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received a letter, dated November 20, 1991, from San Juan County Commissioner Ty 
Lewis. [R 32: Exhibit "F"]. In that letter, there was a reference to an ex parte discussion 
with the Honorable Boyd Bunnell, District Court Judge, about the Commission's 'right' 
to review and appoint attorneys for Gomez and Heird so that they could "protect the 
interests of the County's taxpayers in this situation." Id. 
On October 29, 1991, the San Juan County Attorney, Craig C. Halls (hereinafter 6lhe 
San Juan County Attorney") sent out invitations to an unknown number of local and out-
of-area attorneys to submit a bid: 
Briefly stated the pending charges involve the murder of 
George E. Bonds, who was abducted from a Shell Station in 
Coretz, Colorado during the commission of a burglary or 
theft. Mr. Bonds was kidnaped, taken to Utah where he was 
beaten by one or more of the individuals by the use of fists 
and feet. We believe that Mr. Gomez with the assistance of 
Mr. Heird then took a piece of tubing and tried to strangle the 
victim. After this occurred, a whiskey bottle was busted and 
there was an attempt to cut the throat of the victim. The death 
occurred when a jeep wagoneer driven by Mr. Gomez then 
backed over the victim. The vehicle was then pulled forward 
and once again back over the victim. Both of these 
individuals have criminal records which include prior felonies 
. . . Based upon this brief information, we would invite you 
to submit bids. 
[R 32: Exhibit "B"]. Aside from failing to indicate that the 'facts' set forth in the letter 
were the State's theories, the State failed to mention several significant matters. There 
was absolutely no mention that Heird was driving the vehicle at the time he was initially 
stopped. [R 32: Exhibit "C"]. Likewise, there was no mention that the basis of the stop 
was the suspicion that Heird was driving under the influence. Jd. Nor was there mention 
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of the fact that Heird fled from the stop and was not arrested until he was found during a 
manhunt the following day. IcL No mention was made that Heird made incriminating 
statements during the booking process, implicating himself as the sole actor in the 
murder. [R 32: Exhibit "D"]. 
The San Juan County Commissions' assistant sent a letter, dated November 26, 
1991, to the Honorable Bruce K. Halliday, District Court Judge, requesting that Swenson 
be replaced by the Commission's choice of attorneys for Gomez, Attorney R. Clayton 
Huntsman (hereinafter "Huntsman"). [R 32: Exhibit "G"]. 
On December 2, 1991, Huntsman filed an appearance and request for substitution. 
[R 32: Exhibit "F"]. That same day, Gomez' Affidavit opposing the substitution was 
filed. [R 32: Exhibit "H"]. On December 3, 1991, the motion for substitution of counsel 
was granted. [R 32: Exhibit"I"]. 
After Huntsman began representing Gomez, he presented Gomez with a plea bargain. 
During that discussion, Huntsman promised Gomez that he would only do seven (7) years 
if he pled guilty to the first degree murder charge. [R 32: Exhibits "E," |7(c), "J," "K."] 
Gomez agreed based on the representation that he would do only seven (7) years. [R 32: 
Exhibit "K"]. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The removal of Swenson after the formation of the attorney-client relationship 
violated Gomez' constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel. Both the San 
Juan County Attorney and the trial court interfered with Gomez' attorney-client 
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relationship with Swenson. Both the San Juan County Attorney and the trial court had 
conflicts of interest. The San Juan County Attorney's role in the removal of Swenson and 
appointment of Huntsman, deprived Gomez of his constitutional right to counsel. The 
trial court's ex parte contact with the San Juan County Commissioner and removal of 
Swenson, likewise, deprived Gomez' constitutional right to counsel. 
Huntsman's participation in representing Gomez was also a conflict of interest. He 
knew that Gomez objected to his appointment and that Gomez was represented by 
Swenson. In addition, given the circumstances of his appointment, Huntsman knew that 
his appointment was under the goodwill of the San Juan County Attorney, the San Juan 
County Commission and the District Court Judge. If he ran afoul of that goodwill, 
Huntsman faced being summarily removed from the case. His loyalty was thus divided. 
The conflict was further exacerbated when Huntsman promised Gomez that he would 
only serve seven (7) years in the Utah State Prison if he pled guilty as charged. 
ARGUMENT 
Point I: Gomez was Constitutionally Entitled to Effective Assistance of Counsel. 
The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 1, §12 of the 
Utah State Constitution provides that in a criminal prosecution, the accused is entitled to 
counsel. This right is extended to persons who are indigent. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 
U.S. 335 (1963). 
The obligations and standards in providing a defense for indigent defendants are 
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codified in Utah Code §77-32-301 et. seq. That statute, in relevant part, provides as 
follows: 
Each county, city and town shall provide for the defense of an 
indigent in criminal cases in the courts and various 
administrative bodies of the state in accordance with the 
following minimum standards: 
(1) provide counsel for each indigent who faces the 
substantial probability of the deprivation of the indigent's 
liberty . . . 
(4) assure undivided loyalty of defense counsel to the 
client. 
The issue of the assigned attorneys' compensation is addressed by Utah Code 
§77-32-304(3)(a): 
(1) When representing an indigent, the assigned counsel 
shall: 
(a) counsel and defend the indigent at every stage of 
the proceeding following assignment. . . 
(3) An assigned counsel for an indigent shall be entitled 
to compensation upon: 
(a) approval of the district court where the original trial 
was held. 
The basis for appointing an attorney is set forth in Utah Code §77-32-306: 
The county or municipal legislative body shall either: 
(1) contract to provide the services prescribed by this 
chapter through nonprofit legal aid, other associations, or 
attorneys; or 
(2) authorize the court to provide the services prescribed 
by this chapter by assigning a qualified attorney in each 
case. 
Consistent with the foregoing constitutional and statutory obligations, the trial court 
determined that Gomez was indigent and that he faced the loss of his liberty. Under the 
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authority from San Juan County, the trial court assigned a qualified attorney, Swenson. 
That appointment was neither conditional nor temporary. 
Pursuant to the statutory and ethical obligations, Swenson began representing Gomez. 
At no time did Swenson suffer a physical incapacity nor was an allegation made that he 
was incapacitated. Neither he nor Gomez requested that his appointment be rescinded 
and new counsel be appointed. 
The San Juan County Commission approached the trial court, ex parte, about 
Swenson's representation of Gomez. Ostensibly, the reason was that the 
Commissioners' concern about the cost. After that meeting, the San Juan County 
Attorney sent out an 'invitation' to bid to a select number of attorneys. 
After the Commission selected an attorney, a letter was sent to Swenson telling him 
that he was not selected as Gomez' defense counsel. A letter was also sent to the trial 
court asking that the substitution be ordered. At a hearing on that motion, where both 
Gomez and Swenson objected, the trial court ordered that Huntsman replace Swenson. 
Not only did the County violate its obligation to "assure undivided loyalty of defense 
counsel to the client as set forth in Utah Code §77-32-301(4), but it acted without any 
authority to question the trial court's appointment. 
The trial court lacked the authority to relieve Swenson especially when there were no 
circumstances that would justify such action. The San Juan County Attorney's role as the 
attorney for the San Juan County Commission conflicted with his role as the prosecuting 
attorney. The invitation to bid was riddled with problems. All of these actions 
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unjustifiably interfered with the attorney-client relationship between Swenson and 
Gomez. Finally, substitute counsel's actions constituted a conflict of interest and he was 
ineffective. Based on these errors, Gomez' conviction should be reversed. 
Point II: The Trial Court Lacked the Authority to Remove Swenson 
It is well established that a trial court has broad discretion with respect to 
circumstances which ultimately impact a defendant's constitutional right to counsel. For 
instance, a court can deny a continuance even if it means that a person must be 
represented by different counsel because his counsel of choice is unavailable. Wheat v. 
United States, 486 U.S. 153, 163 (1988); See also, State v. Vessey, 967 P.2d 960 (Ut. Ct. 
App. 1988)(same). A trial court also has the authority to refuse appointment of a lay 
person or an unlicensed attorney. State v. Barlow, 111 P.2d 662 (Ut. Ct. App. 1989); 
State v. Hamilton, 732 P.2d 505 (Utah 1986). Within the context of assuring that the 
accused has a fair trial, other courts have held that a trial court may exercise its inherent 
powers to address situations where counsel has a physical or mental incapacity: 
All will agree that if the defendant's attorney exhibits 
objective evidence of physical incapacity to proceed with a 
meaningful defense of his clients, such as illness, 
intoxication, or a nervous breakdown [citations omitted in 
original], the court need not sit idly by; it should inquire into 
the matter on its own motion, and if necessary relieve the 
affected counsel and order a substitution. Yet even that 
action should be taken with great circumspection and only 
after all reasonable alternatives, such as granting of a 
continuance, have been exhausted. Failure to observe these 
standards, although in a case of undisputed physical 
incapacity of counsel, will compel a reversal of the ensuing 
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judgment; and this will follow regardless of whether the 
defendant's substituted counsel was competent or whether the 
defendant received a 'fair trial' with respect to the guilt-
determining process. {People v. Cravat [1966] 65 Cal.2d 199, 
53Cal. Rpt. 284,417P.2d868.) 
Stearnes v. Clinton, 780 S.W.2d 216, 220 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989), quoting Smith v. 
Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 68 Cal.2d 547, 68 Cal. Rptr. 1, 440 P.2d 65 
(1968). 
Here, there was no objective evidence that Swenson was physically incapacitated. 
The decision to remove Swenson and order substitute counsel was not taken with 
circumspection or after all reasonable alternatives had been exhausted. The sole reason 
set forth was that the prosecutor, who also represented the entity which was statutorily 
responsible for paying for Gomez' defense, wanted Swenson removed. 
The County's fiscal concerns do not rise to the level of a constitutionally protected 
interest. Not only was this concern irrelevant, but the County wholly ignored its statutory 
obligation to "assure undivided loyalty of defense counsel to the client" as set forth in 
Utah Code §77-32-301(4). 
Even assuming that the basis for the removal was fiscal concerns and that such a 
concern was legitimate, the trial court's actions were still unjustified. The trial court, for 
instance, never even inquired as to the fees the Swenson charged, whether Swenson's rate 
was negotiable or any other alternative. Under the circumstances, the trial court simply 
allowed the decision to be dictated by the San Juan County Commission and prosecutor. 
There is no question but that an attorney-client relationship is independent of the 
source of compensation. The attorney's responsibilities clearly lie to the client, not to the 
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person or entity that pays for the legal services: 
(f) A lawyer shall not accept compensation for representing a 
client from one other than the client unless:. . . 
(2) There is not interference with the lawyers independence of 
professional judgment or within the client-lawyer 
relationship. 
Utah Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.8(f)(2). 
That compensation must remain separate is illustrated in the following: 
[OJnce an attorney is appointed the same attorney-client 
relationship is established and it should be protected. Any 
effort to distinguish between the two will be premised upon a 
fallacy because the attorney's responsibility is to the persons 
he has undertaken to represent rather than to the individual or 
agency which pays for the service . . . To hold otherwise 
would be to subject that relationship to unwarranted and 
invidious discrimination arising merely for the poverty of the 
accused. 
Stearnes, 780 S.W.2d at 222, quoting Smith, 440 P.2d at 74. 
Without question, the district court has statutory authority to appoint counsel and to 
approve the rate of compensation. See, Utah Code §77-32-304(3)(a). Yet, here, the 
district court wholly abandoned its role. No complaints were made by Gomez about 
Swenson. Both Gomez and Swenson objected to the appointment of substitute counsel. 
Assuming that the trial court could even consider the fiscal concerns, no bill was ever 
presented to the trial court by Swenson nor did the trial court ask Swenson about his 
rates. The trial court simply and without any evidence, acquiesced to the Commission's 
demand that Swenson be removed. As such, the trial court discriminated against Gomez 
solely on the basis of his poverty. 
11 
This is not to suggest that the trial court would have been bound to pay any bill 
presented by an appointed attorney. Certainly, the trial court possesses the statutory 
authority to approve (or not approve) a billing presented by court appointed counsel. The 
fundamental problem here is the circumstances in which Swenson was removed. 
Under the circumstances presented in this case, the removal of Swenson was a direct 
interference with Gomez5 constitutional right to an attorney. That right cannot be 
interfered with on the basis that the entity statutorily obligated to pay for an indigent 
person's defense did not want the attorney who was appointed. That right, likewise, 
cannot be interfered with by the prosecution. See, In the Matter of the Welfare of 
M.R.S., 400 N.W.2d 147, 153 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987)(Minnesota appellate court reviewed 
an order dismissing a court-appointed attorney and held an "inviolate attorney-client 
relationship had been created,' and rejected the argument that since the county was 
paying for the attorney, the court was entitled to remove that attorney.) 
Here, while it is conceded that once an attorney has been appointed, a trial court has 
the discretion to order a substitution on the request of either the defendant or counsel, it 
does not necessarily follow that the trial court has a concomitant right to remove counsel 
on the "payor's" or prosecutor's request. See generally, People v. Dufee, 215 Mich. 
App. 677, 547 N.W.2d 344 (1996)(No authority for trial court to remove attorney who 
was accused of publicly spreading falsehoods about judge); English v. State, 8 MD. App. 
330, 259 A.2d 822 (1969)("Once counsel has been chosen, whether by the court or by the 
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accused, the accused is entitled to that counsel at trial"); 
The underlying rationale is that investing a Judge with the power to order the outright 
removal of an attorney '"would constitute a severe threat to the independence of the 
defense bar." Stearnes, supra, 788 S.W.2d at 220. Consider again the concern set forth 
in Smith and relied on by Stearnes: 
If an advocate must labor under threat that, at any moment, if 
his argument should incur the displeasure or lack of 
immediate comprehension by the trial judge, he may be 
summarily relieved as counsel on a subjective charge of 
incompetency by the very trial judge he is attempting to 
convince, his advocacy must of necessity be most guarded 
and lose much of its force and effect. 
Stearnes, 780 S.W.2d at 220, quoting Smith, 68 Cal.Rptr. at 10, 440 P.2d at 74. 
Point III: The Interference With the Attorney-Client Relationship bv the 
Prosecuting Attorney and the Trial Court Constituted Impermissible 
Conflicts of Interest. 
In the case at hand, the San Juan County Attorney filed the criminal information 
against Gomez. He was the one who ultimately prosecuted Gomez. At all times relevant 
to this case, the San Juan County Attorney also represented the San Juan County 
Commission. These various roles led to impermissible conflicts of interest. 
It is well established that a prosecutor job's is to ensure that justice is done. Ellis v. 
Gilbert, 429 P.2d 39, 41 (Utah 1967). Indeed, as set forth in the Comment to Rule 3.8, 
Utah Rules of Professional Conduct, SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITIES OF A PROSECUTOR, a 
prosecutor is held to a higher standard: 
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A prosecutor has the responsibility of a minister of justice and 
not simply that of an advocate. This responsibility carries 
with it specific obligations to see that the defendant is 
accorded procedural justice and that guilt is decided upon the 
basis of sufficient evidence. 
In addition, the prosecutor is subject to the Rule 1.7, prohibiting 
conflicts of interest2. The Comment to that rule provides, in relevant part, 
the following: 
Loyalty to a client is . . . impaired when a lawyer cannot 
consider, recommend or carry out an appropriate course of 
action for the client because of the lawyer's other 
responsibilities or interests. 
Here, while acting in the role of the prosecutor, the San Juan County Attorney also 
represented that interests of the San Juan County Commission, the entity who was 
statutorily responsible for paying for the services of the court-appointed attorney. It 
would stand to reason that the Commission would have an interest in not having an 
2The rule, in relevant part, provides that: 
(A) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation 
of that client will be directly adverse to another client, unless: 
(1) The lawyer reasonably believed the 
representation will not adversely affect the relationship 
with the other client; and 
(2) Each client consents after consultation. 
(B) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representa//o« 
of that client will be materially limited by the lawyers 
responsibilities to another client or to a third person or by the 
lawyer's own interest, unless: 
(1) The lawyer reasonable believes that the 
representation will not be adversely affected; and 
(2) Each client consults after consultation. 
14 
aggressive attorney. It would, likewise, stand to reason that a prosecutor would not want 
to have a formidable adversary who puts him to task. Both interests could easily be at 
odds with a defendant's constitutional and statutory right to have effective representation 
as well as with the prosecutor's role to ensure that justice is done. 
After the appointment of Swenson, the San Juan County Attorney sent out the 
invitations to bid. This was not pursuant to a court order nor is there any statutory 
authority allowing the prosecutor (or the Commission's attorney) to do that. 
Assuming arguendo that the San Juan County Attorney had the authority to send out 
the invitations, the selection was riddled with problems. The unanswered questions 
include, for example, how the attorneys that received the invitation' were selected, how 
many invitations' were sent out, when the invitations were sent, and the criteria for 
choosing an attorney. The importance of this cannot be underestimated. Certainly, there 
is the appearance is that the prosecution chose a select group of attorneys, ones who may 
very well not have been as competent or as zealous as Swenson. 
In addition, that the San Juan County Attorney misstated facts and omitted significant 
information further complicates matters. For all that was said, it looked as though there 
was an airtight case against Gomez and his companion. For all anyone knew, Gomez 
had confessed, if not caught in the act. Thus, even if a number of able attorneys were 
notified, the presentation made would have not been as inviting'. 
This is further compounded by the fact that the "invitation to bid" was sent out as a 
result of an ex parte contact with the trial court. Not only did the San Juan County 
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Attorney run afoul of his statutory and ethical obligations, but the trial court's actions 
violated the rules of professional conduct and the canons of judicial conduct: 
Canon 2 A judge shall avoid impropriety and the appearance 
of impropriety in all activities. 
A. A judge shall respect and comply with the law and should 
exhibit conduct that promotes public confidence in the 
integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. 
B. A judge shall not allow . . . relationships to influence the 
judge's judicial conduct or judgement. A judge shall not lend 
the prestige of the judicial office to advance the private 
interests of others; nor shall a judge convey or permit others 
to convey the impression that they are in a special position to 
influence the judge. 
[Emphasis added]. 
The court, at a minimum, advanced the financial interest of the San Juan County 
Commission. Moreover, there is the distinct impression that the San Juan County 
Commission is in a special position to influence the trial court. Not only was the San 
Juan County Commission allowed to contact the court in private, but the court without 
hesitation, did what the Commission and San Juan County Attorney asked of it. 
Canon 3. A judge shall perform the duties of the office 
impartially and diligently. 
(2) A judge shall apply the law and maintain professional 
competence. A judge shall not be swayed by partisan 
interest, public clamor or fear of criticism. 
(7) Except as authorized by law, a judge shall neither initiate 
nor consider, and shall discourage, ex parte or other 
communications concerning a pending or impending 
proceedings. 
[Emphasis added.] 
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Here, the trial court was swayed by a partisan interest: the financial interests of the 
San Juan County Commission. In addition, the court considered and acted on the 
information learned in an ex parte conversation. That the court would engage in such 
conduct is not only a violation of the rules but it is in complete disregard of Gomez' 
constitutional right to counsel. 
Finally and perhaps most important, the unconditional appointment of Swenson, an 
attorney who was proving to be a formidable adversary as well as a zealous advocate, 
combined with the timing of the decision to have other counsel, added up to little more 
than a concerted effort to chill the defense. 
Point IV. Huntsman Provided Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 
Huntsman was well aware of the circumstances that existed when he entered the case. 
He was aware that Gomez wanted to be represented by Swenson and that the County, San 
Juan County Attorney and even the trial court did not want Swenson. It is hard to 
imagine circumstances where a defense attorney could provide a zealous defense for his 
client. See, Rule 1.7(b)3. 
At the very least, Huntsman's appointment was done under the goodwill of the county 
3Rule 1.7(B) provides: 
(B) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representa//0« 
of that client will be materially limited by the lawyers 
responsibilities to another client or to a third person or by the 
lawyer's own interest, unless: 
(1) The lawyer reasonable believes that the 
representation will not be adversely affected; and 
(2) Each client consults after consultation. 
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commission, the prosecutor and the trial court. It stands to reason that Huntsman knew, 
on some level, that if he ran afoul of that goodwill, he was in the same position as 
Swenson. Such circumstances do not allow for zealous representation. Accordingly, 
Huntsman faced a conflict of interest rendering his representation ineffective. 
Huntsman also promised Gomez that if he pled guilty he would do no more than 
seven (7) years. Such a promise is outrageous and falls below the objective level of 
reasonable professional judgment. Had this promise not been made, Gomez would have 
proceeded to trial. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 667 (1984)('To prevail [on 
an ineffective assistance claim], a defendant must show, first that his counsel rendered a 
deficient performance in some demonstrable manner, which performance fell below an 
objective standard of reasonable professional judgment and, second, that counsel's 
performance prejudiced the defendant."); Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516 (Utah 
1994)("[C]ounsePs deficient performance must have 'affected the outcome of the plea 
process."). 
Here, Huntsman represented his client over his client's objection. Huntsman then 
persuaded Gomez to pled to a capital offense based on a promise that Huntsman was not 
entitled to make. This is not only a violation of his ethics, but it is ineffective assistance 
of counsel. 
The right to the effective assistance because its "so basic to a fair trial that [its] 
infraction can never be treated as harmless. State v. Johnson, 823 P2d 484, 488 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1991); State v. Velarde, 806 P.2d 1190, 1192 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). Under the 
circumstances of this case, Gomez was denied the right to counsel and his conviction 
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should be reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully requested that this Court reverse the trial 
court's order dismissing the petition for post-conviction relief. 
DATED
 this , & day of F e ^ . 2002. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed two true and correct copies of the foregoing to 
Christopher Ballard, Assistant Attorney General, PO Box 140854, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84114-0854, postage prepaid, this / > ^ day of FebrTiary7^002. 
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TRIAL COURT'S ORDERS 
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IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SAN JUAN COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ANDY GOMEZ, 
vs . 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
Defendant 
ORDER DISMISSING PETITION 
Case No. 0107-25 
The court has reviewed the petition for extraordinary relief 
of Andy C. Gomez ("Gomez"), the motion to dismiss filed by the 
State of Utah (the "State"), and Gomez' reply. The court now 
orders the petition dismissed for the following reasons: 
1. Gomez raised the claim that his trial attorney Clayton 
Huntsman ("Huntsman") had promised him that he would spend only 
seven years in prison in an earlier petition. When that petition 
was dismissed, he filed no appeal. That claim has therefore been 
previously adjudicated and no good cause exists to consider it 
anew. 
2. Were the court to consider it anew, it would be dismissed 
because the record is clear that Gomez was advised that the amount 
of time he would spend in prison was to be decided by the Utah 
Board of Pardons and Parole. He thus could not have reasonably 
relied on any estimate by Huntsman. It is clear from the plea 
colloquy that whatever Huntsman may have said, Gomez understood 
before he pled guilty that he could serve up to life in prison and 
the Utah Board of Pardons and Parole would decide the length of his 
sentence. 
3. Although the court clearly dismissed as frivolous all 
claims in the petition except the "seven year promise" claim, Gomez 
persists m asserting that Huntsman had a conflict of interest. 
That claim was initially inbedded m the claim that the prosecutor 
had a conflict of interest. In his reply, Gomez separates it out. 
This is the same claim Gomez' first attorney quixotically pursued 
after his appointment had been terminated by seeking permission to 
appeal from the Utah Supreme Court. Gomez clearly abandoned this 
complaint when he pled guilty, but even if he didn't, it is totally 
lacking in merit. Swenson's appointment was terminated once San 
Juan County contracted with Huntsman because San Juan County had 
the right to contract specifically for the defense of Gomez. It 
does not follow that San Juan County, having contracted with 
Huntsman, could abrogate that contract at its whim and require the 
court to appoint yet another attorney. Huntsman thus was not 
conflicted by any possibility that San Juan County would abrogate 
its contract with him. 
DATED the W S / day of August, 2001. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed or hand delivered true and 
correct copies of the foregoing ORDER DISMISSING PETITION, postage 
prepaid, to the following: 
Rosalie Reilly 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 404 
Monticello, UT 84535 
Christopher D. Ballard 
Assistant Attorney General 
P.O. Box 140854 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0180 
jOjA " ^ ^ ^ 'V 
DATED t h e 1 d a y of -Au«£e^7 2 0 0 1 . 
Deputy VC^ur.c \Z le rk 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SAN JUAN COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ANDY GOMEZ, | PARTIAL SUMMARY DISMISSAL 
Petitioner, ANE ORDER DIRECTING SERVICE 
OF PETITION 
vs . 
STATE OF UTAH Case No. 010 7-25 
Resoondent. 
Petitioner Andy C. Gomez ("Gomez") filed a petition for post-
conviction relief en March 12, 2C01. Rule S5C (g)(1), U.R.C.P., 
requires this court to review the petition and dismiss any claims 
that are frivolous en their face. Rule 65C (h) requires the court 
to direct the court to serve a copy of the petition on the Attorney 
General if some part of the petition is not summarily dismissed. 
Denial of Counsel 
Gomez claims that he was denied his constitutional right to 
counsel because: 
1. San Juan County retained substitute counsel with the 
court's approval, and the attorney originally assigned was 
discharged. 
2. The prosecutor also represented San Juan County in 
soliciting bids for attorneys to represent Gomez. 
3. The counsel who ultimately represented Gomez was 
incompetent because he promised Gomez he would only spend seven 
years m prison. 
The counsel originally appointed for Gomez was Eric P. Swenson 
I "Swenson"). Swenson did not accept his replacement willingly and 
filed a petition with the Utah Supreme Court asKing that he be 
reinstated as Gomez' lawyer. That petition was net granted. It is 
ocvious that Gomez knew that tnere was an issue about this because 
he filed an affidavit expressing his desire tnat S^enscn remain nis 
attorney. 
The first two issues raised by Gomez m suppcrz of his claim 
that he was denied his right to counsel are clearly frivolous. 
Gomez had no right to the appointment of a particular lawyer, and 
there is nothing constitutionally offensive about permitting San 
Juan County to advertise for bids from someone willing and able to 
represent Gomez for a fixed fee. 
Similarly, though it may be preferable for counties to exclude 
the prosecutor from the process of advertising for bids, there is 
no allegation that Gomez' counsel was ultimately selected by anyone 
other than San Juan County's governing board, which has that right. 
The only limitation on the county is that the counsel must be 
competent. In addition, both of these issues were clearly known to 
Gomez when he entered his plea. Ey doing so, he waived these 
claims. 
The allegation that Gomez' counsel promised he would only 
serve seven years m prison is a different matter. Whether this 
allegation is true cannot be determined solely on Gomez' word. 
There is an interesting contrast between the account of this given 
cy Swenson and that given by another attorney who represented Gomez 
m another case, William L. Benge. Clayton Huntsman, who 
ultimately represented Gomez, might offer yec anotner account. 
Even though there is a question acout whether Gomez could have been 
deceived about this given the content of his defendant's statement 
and his colloquy witn Judge Bunnell, the court wculd liKe a 
response from respondent before deciding this issue. 
The Guilty Plea 
Gomez' claims abcut his guilty plea failing to comply witn 
Rule 11, Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure, are so ccvicusly 
frivolous that they border on a violation of Rule 11, U.R.C.?. 
First, counsel for Gomez has enviously failed to read the 1SS1 
version of the Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure. In 1991, Rule 11 
included no requirement that defendant be advised of his right to 
a speedy public trial before an impartial ]ury, the right to be 
presumed innocent, or the right to compel the attendance of defense 
witnesses. It also does not require that he be advised of his 
rignt to appeal. 
Gomez' counsel has also failed to present, in addition to the 
colloquy, the defendant's statement that Gomez apparently 
acknowledged reading and understanding. The law is clear that 
compliance with Rule 11 can be accomplished at least m part 
through a defendant's affidavit. 
The most glaring omission m Gomez' claim of a Rule 11 
violation is the failure to cite Salazar v. Warden, 852 P.2d 933 
(Utah 1993), which clearly establishes that a failure to comply 
with Rule 11 is not m itself a violation of the Utah or U.S. 
Constitution. Gomez must not only show thac Rule 11 was net 
oompiied with; he must show that the guilty plea was in fact 
involuntary. He has not even attempted this. 
Conclusion. 
The court hereby orders the summary dismissal of all Gomez' 
claims except the claim that his counsel was incompetent because he 
promised Gomez that he would spend only seven years m prison. The 
clerk is directed to serve a copy of the petition on the Utah 
Attorney General so that a rescor.se can be made as orovided bv law. 
DATED the &/l^ day of March, 2 0C1. 
/i n 
*U.{ db^U Dys^ncc Courc uudce 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed true and correct copies of the 
foregoing PARTIAL SUMMARY DISMISSAL AND ORDER DIRECTING*" SERVICE OF 
PETITION, postage prepaid, to the following: 
Rose Reilly 
Atcorney ac Law 
P.O. Box 404 
Mcncicello, UT 84535 
State of Utah 
ffice of the Utah Acternev Gene: 
150 E. 300 S. , 5"-n Floor 
P.O. Box 140873 
Sale Lake City, UT 84I14-0< 
DATED the - -y/^. 
-~ dav or Mar en, 
>>,<',:<>•' <or* •r.t 
Jepucy" Ccurc Clergy/ 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
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Sixth Amendment United States Constitution 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right 
to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State 
and district wherein the crime shall have been committed; 
which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, 
and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; 
to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have 
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor; and 
to have the assistance of counsel for his defense. 
Article 1, Section 12, Utah State Constitution 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to 
appear and defend in person and by counsel, to demand the 
nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a copy 
thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the 
witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to compel 
the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a 
speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or 
district in which the offense is alleged to have been 
committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no instance 
shall any accused person, before final judgement be 
compelled to advance money or fees to secure the rights 
herein guaranteed. The accused shall not be compelled to 
give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be compelled 
to testify against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, 
nor shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same 
offense. 
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STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
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Utah Code § 77-32-301. Minimum standards for defense of an indigent 
Each county, city, and town shall provide for the defense of 
an indigent in criminal cases in the courts and various 
administrative bodies of the state in accordance with the 
following minimum standards: 
(1) provide counsel for each indigent who faces the 
substantial probability of the deprivation of the 
indigent's liberty; 
(2) afford timely representation by competent legal 
counsel; 
(3) provide the investigatory resources necessary for a 
complete defense; 
(4) assure undivided loyalty of defense counsel to the 
client; 
(5) proceed with a first appeal of right; and 
(6) prosecute other remedies before or after a 
conviction, considered by defense counsel to be in the 
interest of justice except for other and subsequent 
discretionary appeals or discretionary writ 
proceedings. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-32-304 Duties of assigned counsel — Compensation 
(1) When representing an indigent, the assigned counsel 
shall: 
1. counsel and defend the indigent at every stage of 
the proceeding following assignment; and 
2. file any first appeal of right or other remedy before 
or after conviction that the assigned counsel considers 
to be in the interest of justice, except for other and 
subsequent discretionary appeals or discretionary writ 
proceedings. 
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(2) An assigned counsel may not have the duty or power 
under this section to represent an indigent in any 
discretionary appeal or action for a discretionary writ, 
other than in a meaningful first appeal of right to 
assure the indigent an adequate opportunity to present 
the indigent's claims fairly in the context of the 
appellate process of this state. 
(3) An assigned counsel for an indigent shall be entitled to 
compensation upon: 
(a) approval of the district court where the original 
trial was held; 
(b) a showing that: 
(i) the indigent has been denied a constitutional 
right; or 
(ii) there was newly discovered evidence that 
would show the indigent's innocence; and 
(c) that the legal services rendered by counsel were: 
(i) other than that required under this chapter or 
under a separate fee arrangement; and 
(ii) necessary for the indigent and not for the 
purpose of delaying the judgment of the original 
trier of fact. 
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CODES AND RULES 
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Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 2 
A judge shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of 
impropriety in all activities. 
A. A judge shall respect and comply with the law and 
should exhibit conduct that promotes public 
confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the 
judiciary. 
B. A judge shall not allow family, social or other 
relationships to influence the judge's judicial conduct 
or judgement. A judge shall not lend the prestige of 
the judicial office to advance the private interests of 
others; nor shall a judge convey or permit others to 
convey the impression that they are in a special 
position to influence the judge. A judge shall not 
testify voluntarily as a character witness but may 
provide honest references in the regular course of 
business or social life. 
C. A judge shall not belong to any organization, other 
than a religious organizatioa which practices invidious 
discrimination on the basis of race, sex, religion or 
national origin. 
Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 3 (B)(2)<7) 
A judge shall perform the duties of the office impartially and 
diligently. 
B. Adjudicative Responsibilities 
(2) A judge shall apply the law and maintain professional 
competence. A judge shall not be swayed by partisan 
interest, public clamor or fear of criticism 
(7) A judge shall accord to every person who is legally 
interested in a proceeding, or that person's lawyer, full 
right to be heard according to law. Except as 
authorized by law, a judge shall neither initiate nor 
consider, and shall discourage, ex parte or other 
communications concerning a pending or impending 
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proceedings. A judge may consult with court 
personnel whose function is to aid the judge in 
carrying out the judge's adjudicative responsibilities or 
with other judges provided that the judge does not 
abrogate the responsibility to personally decide the 
case pending before the court. No communication 
respecting a pending or impending proceeding shall 
occur between the trial judge and an appellate court 
unless a copy of any written communication or the 
substance of any oral communication is provided to all 
parties. A judge may obtain the advice of a 
disinterested expert on the law applicable to a 
proceeding before the court if the judge gives notice to 
the parties of the person consulted and the substance of 
the advice, and affords the parties reasonable 
opportunity to respond. A judge may, with the consent 
of the parties either in writing or on the record, confer 
separately with the parties and their lawyers in effort to 
mediate or settle matters pending before the judge. 
Utah Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.7 
Conflict of Interest: general rule. 
(A) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the 
representation of that client will be directly adverse to 
another client, unless: 
(1) The lawyer reasonably believed the 
representation will not adversely affect the relationship 
with the other client; and 
(2) Each client consents after consultation. 
(B) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the 
representation of that client will be materially limited 
by the lawyers responsibilities to another client or to a 
third person or by the lawyer's own interest, unless: 
(1) The lawyer reasonably believes that the 
representation will not be adversely affected and; 
(2) Each client consults after consultation 
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Utah Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.8(f)(2). 
(f) A lawyer shall not accept compensation for 
representing a client from one other than the client 
unless: 
(2) There is not interference with the lawyers 
independence of professional judgment or within the 
client-lawyer relationship. 
Utah Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 3.8 
SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITIES OF A PROSECUTOR 
A prosecutor has the responsibility of a minister of justice and 
not simply that of an advocate. This responsibility carries 
with it specific obligations to see that the defendant is 
accorded procedural justice and that guilt is decided upon the 
basis of sufficient evidence. 
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